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Abstract: A choice of a subcontractor may have critical impact on realization of the 
project, it has influence on the cost, duration, and quality. Selection of the best sucontractor 
can be defined as multiple criteria decision making problem (MCDM) of choosing a proper 
offer from set of alternatives evaluated by using set of criteria. Decision maker should 
determine the criteria as objective and measurable. Significance of decision making 
problem is presented by large amount of theories and methods developed for solving 
MCDM problems and number of criteria considered in these problems. A Condorcet 
method (formulated over two centuries ago) is commonly accepted for democratic (majority 
of criteria determines the winner) and fair election – a Condorcet winner is the alternative 
which is preferred in all pair-wise comparisons. According to social choice theory where 
a Condorcet winner cannot be obtained from a set of alternatives, the best solution is close 
to being a Condorcet winner. The paper presents four selection methods of the best 
alternative that is as close as possible to being a Condorcet winner and contains examples of 
a subcontractor selection using only ordinal scales of evaluation of alternatives. 
Keywords: project management, subcontractors selection, social choice theory, the 
Condorcet winner. 
1. Multi criteria subcontractor selection problem 
A general contractor evaluates bid proposals for a construction works taking into account 
several criteria, for example costs, project duration or contractor’s experience. He must make 
the best compromise choice among the set of alternatives (subcontractors)  1, ..., nA a a  
evaluated using set of criteria  1, ..., nC c c . The importance of the criteria is usually 
different from point of view of the general contractor, therefore often criteria have assigned 
weights. Variants evaluation should be performed to fulfill decision maker requirements. The 
criteria should be the most objective and measurable. In the case of using many criteria, the 
objective evaluation of variants is difficult, especially that part of criteria is quantitative and 
part is qualitative. That problem can be effectively solved only by application of objective 
multi-attribute decision making methods. They allow to apply many criteria, also contradictory 
to each other. Variety of applied methods and procedures to aid decision making testifies about 
problem complexity and about difficulty in formulation of universal solutions. The method 
should be appropriate to solve multi faced problem. 
Factors influence on subcontractors selection were identified by many researches by 
questionnaire survey [1, 2, 3]. Many of them are qualitative (e.g. safety and health at work, 
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instruction and training or reputation) so the popular method of subcontractors selection is 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) [4, 5, 6, 7]. This is because the decision maker must only 
define relative dominance of alternatives. In case of qualitative criteria, pairwise 
comparison of relative dominance of alternatives replaces necessity of quantification of 
alternatives ratings. Number of elements compared should be small (not more than 9) to 
improve accuracy of measurement [8].  
The information obtained about the subcontractors are often approximate, imprecise 
and their scope is insufficient to make a decision. The decision-maker in many cases can 
easier determine relative preferences by identifying the range of values or in narrative form 
rather than by giving specific values form the accepted range of grades. Fuzzy set theory 
allows to incorporate uncertainty measures to multi attribute decision [9, 10]. 
Arrow and Raynauld [11] presented an analogy between social choice theory and 
multi-criteria decision-making methods. A rank in criterion order can be treated as electoral 
votes. In ordinal ranking methods there is no need to evaluate alternatives against criteria 
using interval or ratio scale in case quantitative criteria and convert qualitative into 
quantitative. There is no need to determine weights of criteria too. For all criteria a decision 
maker creates a preference relation (linear order) of variants. For each criterion variants are 
numbered in increasing order from 1 to n according to a decision maker preference. 
Preferred variant r to s respect to criterion j occurs before s in profile j and his rank is 
smaller then s. Pairwise comparision of variants allows to create an outraking matrix W. 
Entries  srw ,  are number of criteria where r is prefered to s. Winning margin  sru ,  is 
defined as the difference between the number of criteria preferring r variant relative to s, so 
U=W-WT. Based on preference relations for each criterion it is possible to identify the 
winner or create collective preference order. 
2. Subcontractor selection using condorcet method 
Condorcet more than two centuries ago formulated a rule, that winner is a variant r 
such ∀s ≠ r, w(r, s) > m/2 (a Condorcet winner defeats each variant in more than 50% of 
criteria) or u(r, s)>0. Condorcet looser defeats in pairwise comparison with all others. 
Linear order satisfied Condorcet’s rule, if preferred variant r to s occurs before s (the rank r 
is smallest than s) for all r≠s. Condorcet’s winner, looser and order not always exist in 
a given set of criteria. A Condorcet method (formulated over two centuries ago) is 
commonly accepted for democratic (majority of criteria determines the winner) and fair 
election – a Condorcet winner is the alternative which is preferred in all pair-wise 
comparisons.  
Pairwise comparison results can be presented as a complete asymmetric directed 
graph  EAT ,  so called tournament, which consists of a set of vertex (variants) 
 TA and set of arcs      TATATE  . The arc  sr,  exists if variant r is preferred to s 
 sr   by majority of criterion. The tournament 𝑇 is transitive if   Tji ,  and   Tkj ,  implies   Tki , . There exists overall linear order which complies with a preference 
relation for each criterion in transitive tournament. 
In case when it is not possible to select the Condorcet winner from the social choice 
theory point of view, the chosen candidate should be „as closely as possible” to Condorcet 
winner. Approximate algorithm to choose the winner should satisfy Condorcet criterion and 
place a Condorcet winner in the first place if it exists. The algorithm should introduce 
minimal perturbances is preference relations for criteria when variant is turn to a Condorcet 
winner. 
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Finding Slater solution [12] is based on determining the minimal number of arc in 
tournament  EAT ,  which should be reversed to determine linear orders, what is 
equivalent with selection of a Condorcet winner. A Slater order minimizes distance between 
overall ranking and a preference relation for criteria according to the majority rule. A few 
Slater orders can exist, but in each Condorcet Winner is a Slater Winner [13].  
Computation Slater order is NP-hard equivalent to the minimum feedback arc set 
problem on tournaments [14, 15]. A Slater order can be find by solving integer linear 
program [16]: 
 

Eji
ijijxw
,
:max  (1) 
kjixxx kijkij ,,,2   (2) 
 jijixx jiij  ,,1  (3) 
  jixij ,,1,0   (4) 
Weight of arc   1, jiw  if and only if   Tji , , -1 otherwise. Binary variable 
1ijx  when   Tji , and takes value 0 otherwise, so the goal function (1) maximizes 
number of arcs used from the tournament to transform him into a linear order (minimizing 
number of reversing arcs in tournament T). Condition (2) is a transitive constrain 
(eliminates directed cycles of length 3 in the tournament), set of constraints (3) and (4) 
cause that only one directed arc joining two different nodes exists.  
Young score [17] for variant r is maximal subset of profiles (or the minimal number of 
profiles have to be ignored) which should be taken into account to determine a Condorcet 
winner). The maximal number of profiles is called Young score. The Young winner is a 
variant with the highest Young score. Approximate the Young score is NP-hard [18, 19] .  
Let Aar   be a variant for which Young score is calculated,  1,0jx  binary 
variable. Variable 1jx  if criterion j belongs to the subset of profiles which are included 
for computing Young’s score for ra . Constant 
i
rje  depends on preference relations for 
criteria and  jreirj 1  when in profile j variant ra  is preferred than ia  or 
1irje when in profile j variant ia  is preferred than ra . Young score for ra  can be 
obtained by solving integer linear program [19]: 
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  mjx j ,2,1,1,0    (7) 
The goal function (5) maximizes number of profiles which cause that variant ra is 
turned into the Condorcet winner – equation (6). 
Moving variant ra  in individual ranking for criterion j  by 
 1,,1,0(  nkk  position causes that winning margin for ra  over  ri aAa \  
increases by  1,0ijke . Constant  ri ad  is minimal number of criteria in which ra  
additionally has to get additional vote to defeat  ri aAa \  (the deficit of criterion votes 
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for variant ra ). If ra is preferred in relation to  ri aAa \  then   .0ri ad The least 
number of switches in rankings for criteria is called Dodgston score  iaD . Dodgsone is 
more often known as Lewis Carroll. Computing a Dodgson winner is NP-hard problem [20, 
21]. Dodgson’s winner is a variant with the smallest value  iaD . For variant ra  Dogstone 
score can be computed by solving integer linear program [20]: 
 
j k
jkxk:min   (8) 
jx
k
jk  ,1  (9) 
   ra\, Aaadxe iri
j k
jkijk   (10) 
  kjx jk ,,1,0   (11) 
Binary variable 1jkx  when in preference order type j variant ra  is moved upwards 
by k positions. The goal function (8) minimizes number of switches in preference orders for 
criteria, set of constraints (9) cause that in each preference order it is possible to move ra  
only one time. Set of constraints (10) ensures that ra  variant becomes the Condorcet 
winner. 
In Condorcet least-reversal system a winner is the variant which became the 
Condorcet after reversing the minimum possible number of pairwise comparisons [22]. 
After making the minimum number of reversals a new outranking matrix is created with 
entries  srwrclv , . For variant ra  the distance between two profiles origin and after revising 
can be calculated as follows:  
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The winner is a variant with minimal distance. In a simpler way the winner is the 
variant ra  minimizing [23]: 
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3. A case study of subcontractor selecting using the Condorcet rule  
Application of the Condorcet method to select te subcontractor will be presented on 
the example of selection one of the five offers evaluated using five criteria: cost (1), 
duration time (2), quality (3), subcontractor experience (4) and warranty (5). Decision 
maker prepared ranking of subcontractors for each criterion as follows: 
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1c : 31524 aaaaa  , 
2c : 41253 aaaaa  , 
3c : 53412 aaaaa   
4c : 42153 aaaaa   
5c : 45231 aaaaa  , 
In this example there is no a Condorcet Winner, because the offer which beats others 
in pairwise comparisons do not exist. In the tournament there are two directed cycles: 1-3-2-
1 and 1-3-5-1. Variant 5a  is the Condorcet looser. The pairwise comparison graph of 
example is shown in Fig. 1. 
1
2 3
4 5
 
Fig. 1. The majority tournament of an example 
By reversing only one arc (1,3) we obtain unique Slater order (3-2-5-1-4) and offer 3a  
became the Slater winner (Figure 2). 
1
2 3
4 5
 
Fig. 2. The Slater acyclic tournament for the example 
Ignoring the preference orders for criteria 1c  and 2c  we return offer 1a  into the 
Condorcet winner: 
3c : 53412 aaaaa   
4c : 42153 aaaaa   
5c : 45231 aaaaa  , 
and Young score for 1a  is equal 3. 
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For offer 2a  we must include profiles for criteria 1c , 2c  and 3c : 
1c : 31524 aaaaa  , 
2c : 41253 aaaaa  , 
3c : 53412 aaaaa   
so Y( 2a ) = 3. 
Similarly Y( 3a ) = 3 (c2, c4 and c5 criteria are included), Y(a4) = 1 – 1c  criteriin. The 
offer 5a  cannot be a Condorcet winner. Consequently the overall preference order 
according to Young score is following: 54321 aaaaa  . 
The 1a  offer loses with 2a  and 5a in relation 2:3. According to the Dodgson’s rule, to 
make 1a  the Condorcet winner , it’s enough to place the solution in ranking for 1c  in the 
second position: 
1c : 35214 aaaaa  , 
2c : 41253 aaaaa  ,  
3c : 53412 aaaaa   
4c : 42153 aaaaa   
5c : 45231 aaaaa  , 
or for 2c  move upwards at two positions: 
2c : 42513 aaaaa  . 
Hence Dodgston’s score is equal   21 aD . The same results can be obtain by 
moving 1a at one position in ballots for criteria 1c and 2c  or for 3c and 4c . 
The offer 2a  loses only with 3a in relation 2:3. Moving in ranking for 5c criterion at 
one position: 
1c : 31524 aaaaa  , 
2c : 41253 aaaaa  , 
3c : 53412 aaaaa   
4c : 42153 aaaaa   
5c : 45321 aaaaa  , 
causes that 2a  becomes the Condorcet winner −   12 aD .  
Similarly:   13 aD  by changing the position of 3a and 1a  in profile for criterion 
1c or 5c . The offer a4 needs two additional votes against a1 and a2 and one against a3 and 
a5. Changing for example preferences of orders for 2c : 12534 aaaaa   and 
4c : 21453 aaaaa   we get Dodgson’s score   64 aD . Moving 5a  at one position 
in preferences of orders for 1c , 2c and 3c : 
1c : 31254 aaaaa  , 
2c : 41235 aaaaa  , 
3c : 35412 aaaaa   
we have   35 aD . 
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Overall ranking in Dodgon method is following: 45132 aaaaa   . 
In Condorcet least-reversal system outranking matrices W, U are created and next 
sums of rows are calculated according to (13) and (14) as follows: 
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and as a consequence: 45132 aaaaa  . 
The summery results are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Overall preference order for applied methods 
Method 
Rank of subcontractor 
1a  2a  3a  4a  5a  
Slater’s rule 4 2 1 5 3 
Young’s rule 1 1 1 4 5 
Dodgson’s rule 3 1 1 5 4 
Condorcet least-reversal system 3 1 1 5 4 
4. Conclusions 
A choice of subcontractor impacts on a construction project duration, cost and quality. 
Selection of the best subcontractor can be defined as MCDM problem of choosing a proper 
offer from the set of alternatives evaluated by using the set of criteria. Social choice theory 
can be also applied in a supplier selection, who is evaluated using many criteria, where the 
position in criteria ranking is identified with the voices of voters. The offers evaluation 
requies only to prepare a preference relation for each criteria what simplifies decision 
making in the case of using many incommensurable criteria. The article presents ranking 
rules: Slater, Young, Dogstone and Condorcet least-reversal system. The application of 
those methods allows to chose the candidate closest to the Condorcet winner, in case whten 
Condorcet winner do not exist. The way of choosing the best offer is intuitive and 
commonly understood. The difference is in computational complexity and may lead to 
different overall orders arrangements, but place the Condorcet Winner on the first place if it 
exists. Author to solve the integer linear programs to determine the winner used LINGO 
14.0 Optimization Modeling Software. Implementation of ranking methods to choose the 
offers in construction requires to elaborate easy to use computer software, what will be the 
further stage of author works.  
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